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Abstract
This short paper concerns discretization schemes for representing and computing ap-
proximate Nash equilibria, with emphasis on graphical games, but briefly touching on
normal-form and poly-matrix games. The main technical contribution is a representation
theorem that informally states that to account for every exact Nash equilibrium using a
nearby approximate Nash equilibrium on a grid over mixed strategies, a uniform discretiza-
tion size linear on the inverse of the approximation quality and natural game-representation
parameters suffices. For graphical games, under natural conditions, the discretization is
logarithmic in the game-representation size, a substantial improvement over the linear de-
pendency previously required. The paper has five other objectives: (1) given the venue, to
highlight the important, but often ignored, role that work on constraint networks in AI has
in simplifying the derivation and analysis of algorithms for computing approximate Nash
equilibria; (2) to summarize the state-of-the-art on computing approximate Nash equi-
libria, with emphasis on relevance to graphical games; (3) to help clarify the distinction
between sparse-discretization and sparse-support techniques; (4) to illustrate and advocate
for the deliberate mathematical simplicity of the formal proof of the representation the-
orem; and (5) to list and discuss important open problems, emphasizing graphical-game
generalizations, which the AI community is most suitable to solve.
1. Introduction
There has been quite a bit of work over last 10 years, mostly, but not exclusively, in the
theoretical computer science community, on the problem of computing approximate Nash
equilibria in games (see, e.g., the work of Kearns, Littman, & Singh, 2001; Vickrey & Koller,
2002; Ortiz & Kearns, 2003; Lipton, Markakis, & Mehta, 2003; Singh, Soni, & Wellman,
2004; Soni, Singh, & Wellman, 2007; Daskalakis, Mehta, & Papadimitriou, 2007; Tsak-
nakis & Spirakis, 2007; Feder, Nazerzadeh, & Saberi, 2007; Daskalakis & Papadimitriou,
2008; Daskalakis, Mehta, & Papadimitriou, 2009; Kontogiannis, Panagopoulou, & Spirakis,
2009; He´mon, de Rougemont, & Santha, 2008; Awasthi, Balcan, Blum, Sheffet, & Vempala,
2010; Bosse, Byrka, & Markakis, 2010; Ponsen, de Jong, & Lanctot, 2011 and the refer-
ences therein; see also the book by Nisan, Roughgarden, E´va Tardos, & Vazirani, 2007 for
additional references). 1
1. To keep the focus and length of this short paper, the presentation and motivation of the significance
and broader scientific and practical impact the study of Nash equilibria is beyond the scope of this
paper. Similarly, the main focus here is on graphical games (GGs) and absolute approximations of Nash
equilibria, the most common type of approximation found in the literature. However, the curious reader
can go to Appendix A to find a brief discussion of the significance of Nash equilibria (Appendix A.1),
other classes of graphical models for game theory (Appendix A.2), and other types of approximations of
Nash equilibria (Appendix A.3).
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This short paper revisits the simple uniform-discretization scheme that Kearns et al.
(2001) originally introduced in the context of n-player 2-action graphical games (GGs). (For-
mal definitions of concepts from game theory, graph theory, AI, and uniform-discretization
appear in Section 3. The presentation in the Introduction will remain informal.)
Kearns et al. (2001) showed that if the size of the individual grid that the uniform-
discretization scheme induces over the probability of playing an action was O(2k/ǫ), where
k is the size of the largest set of neighbors of any player and ǫ is an approximation quality
parameter, then for each exact Nash equilibrium of the GG, its closest joint mixed-strategy
in the resulting regular joint grid is an approximate ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the GG. 2 Kearns
et al. (2001) used that discretization to design a special type of dynamic-programming
algorithm tailored to computing approximate Nash equilibria in GGs with tree-structured
graphs they called TreeNash that runs in time linear in the number of players and O(2k
2
),
assuming a fixed ǫ. The size of the input representation of the n-player 2-action GG is
O(n 2k). In collaboration with Prof. Kearns, we later extended TreeNash as a heuristic
for GGs with loopy graphs, leading to an algorithm we called NashProp, which stands for
“Nash Propagation” (Ortiz & Kearns, 2003).
An unpublished note drafted back in December 2002 (Ortiz, 2002), later posted online3
as part of a course on computational game theory taught by Prof. Michael Kearns during
the Spring 2003 at the University of Pennsylvania, provided a significantly sharper bound of
O(k/ǫ) on the size of the discretization required to achieve the same approximation result.
The revised bound was logarithmic in the representation size of the game, as opposed to the
previous linear bound that Kearns et al. (2001) derived. 4 The revised, significantly tighter
upper-bound led to an improved running time of O(kk) for TreeNash in terms of just k,
which meant that, when using the sparser discretization derived in the old note (Ortiz,
2002), TreeNash becomes a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (quasi-PTAS)
to compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2008) independently
rediscovered this result, about five years later, using a considerably more complex approach
to the proof/derivation than the simple, algebraic approach presented in the old note (Ortiz,
2002) and here.
Similarly, some of the results regarding algorithmic implications presented here that fol-
lowed from the old note (Ortiz, 2002), particularly for normal-form games, have also been
independently rediscovered in the literature using different approaches throughout the years
(see, e.g., some of the results of Lipton et al., 2003, and Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2008).
Those particular results, discussed in more detail in the technical sections of this paper,
followed immediately from the improved discretization bound given in the old note (Or-
tiz, 2002), combined with previously known results from the CSP and graphical-models
literature in AI.
The present short paper extends the old note (Ortiz, 2002) and shows how the im-
proved discretization-size bounds for GGs, and some specializations, fall off immediately as
corollaries of a theorem that holds for GG generalizations.
2. In an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, players tolerate losing expected gains, up to an ǫ amount, from not unilaterally
deviating.
3. http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/teaching/cgt/revised_approx_bnd.pdf
4. Note that Kearns et al. (2001) only considered the case of binary actions, i.e., m = 2, hence m does not
play a role in the results within the context of that paper.
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In particular, the current paper presents a result on the sufficient size for uniform dis-
cretization to capture, in a formal sense, every possible Nash equilibrium of the game via
another close approximate Nash equilibria in the induced grid over the space of mixed
strategies of players in the game. As example corollaries of the main result, for graphi-
cal games with largest neighborhood size k, the sufficient size is O(km/ǫ), which implies,
O(nm/ǫ) for standard normal-form games, while for n-player m-action poly-matrix games,
the sufficient size is O(m/ǫ).
Similarly, the representation result yields immediate computational results based on
connection to algorithms for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). Section 6 presents
and discusses several results on polynomial and quasi-polynomial time algorithms for several
interesting subclasses of graphical and normal-form games that fall off from that connection.
The paper ends with a discussion of the algorithmic implications that the main technical
result may have on other work in computational game theory. It also lists several open
problems.
2. Motivation
This section provides additional motivation for the necessity and significance of the study
of the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria, particularly in GGs, and for
the development and dissemination of this short paper, with emphasis on its particular
relevance to the AI community.
2.1 The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria: State of Affairs
Chen and Deng (2005b) settled the complexity of computing an exact Nash equilibrium in
bimatrix games, a 50-years-old open problem, proving the problem to be PPAD-complete
(see also later work by Chen & Deng, 2006 and Chen, Deng, & Teng, 2009). 5 Daskalakis,
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (2006) later proved the same result (see also the presentation
of Daskalakis, Goldberg, & Papadimitriou, 2009a, 2009b). This means that a polynomial-
time algorithm for this problem is unlikely. This seminal result was the culmination of a
series of results that same year for 3-player (Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2005; Chen &
Deng, 2005a), and 4-player (Daskalakis, Goldberg, & Papadimitriou, 2005) normal-form
games.
Within the game-theory community, Bubelis (1979) devised a polynomial-time reduction
of any n-player normal-form game to some 3-player normal-form game; in the theoretical
computer science community, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2005) rediscovered a similar
result, reducing n-player normal-form games to 4-player normal-form games. This last
result rendered the computational complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium in arbitrary
n-player normal-form games as PPAD-complete (Goldberg & Papadimitriou, 2005).
Several results on the PPAD-completeness of computing Nash equilibria in arbitrary
GGs served as lemmas to the proofs for normal-form games (Daskalakis et al., 2005;
Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2005). In fact, GGs played a very important role in finally
settling the computational complexity of bimatrix games.
5. Papadimitriou (1994) introduced the complexity class PPAD to characterize fixed-point-type problems
such as those of Nash equilibria in which a solution always exists. A discussion on the complexity class
PPAD is beyond the scope of this short paper.
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There is other important, seminal work regarding the computation of Nash equilibria
prior to the hardness results discussed above, including some regarding other equilibrium
notions such as pure-strategy Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974,
1987) in graphical and normal-form games (see, e.g., the work of Gilboa and Zemel (1989),
McKelvey and McLennan (1996), Kakade, Kearns, Langford, and Ortiz (2003), Gottlob,
Greco, and Scarcello (2005), Conitzer and Sandholm (2008), Papadimitriou and Rough-
garden (2008), Roughgarden (2009), Jiang and Leyton-Brown (2011), and the references
therein). But the focus of this short paper is on representing and computing approximate
Nash equilibria in GGs.
2.2 A Caveat: Exact vs. Approximate Nash Equilibria in Multiplayer Games
Technically, the result for more than 3 players is for the problem of computing an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium with an approximation quality exponentially small in the represen-
tation size of the game. This is because, as is well-known since Nash’s journal version (Nash,
1951) of his original paper (Nash, 1950), Nash presents a poker-inspired game of 3 players,
built in collaboration with Lloyd Shapley, a 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, in which all
payoff hypermatrix entries/values are rational numbers, but whose unique Nash equilibrium
contains mixed strategies with irrational numbers.
Chen, Deng, and Teng (2006) also proved that there does not exist a fully-polynomial-
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium,
unless PPAD=P (see also the presentation of Chen et al., 2009). 6 For this result, they
proved that the approximation quality can not go below an inverse-polynomial function of
the representation size of the game. They stated in their paper, without proof, that it is
easy to extend the result for 2-player normal-form games to n-player normal-form games
and n-player graphical games. Hence, computing a Nash equilibrium (or more formally,
an approximate Nash equilibrium with approximation quality inversely-exponential in the
representation size of the game), in an arbitrary n-player GG is PPAD-complete. Yet,
it is still open whether there exists a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for
n-player games in normal-form and arbitrary GGs.
The result of Daskalakis et al. (2009a) also implied that the problem of computing an ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium in n-player normal-form games, for n ≥ 2, with approximation
quality inversely exponential on the game’s representation size is PPAD-complete.
All of the above helps us motivate the study of approximate Nash equilibria in arbitrary
GGs from a technical perspective:
(a) there are multiplayer games with payoff matrices represented entirely using rational
numbers but with unique Nash equilibria formed of mixed strategies with irrational
numbers;
(b) computing “exact” Nash equilibria is likely to be computationally intractable in gen-
eral; and
6. Formal definitions of the different approximation schemes, which textbooks such as those of Vazirani
(2001) and Williamson and Shmoys (2011) cover, are beyond the scope of this short paper. See Ap-
pendix D for a general description of some of the approximation schemes.
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(c) while there is no FPTAS to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium with approx-
imation quality below a value inversely polynomial of the representation size of the
game, the existence of a PTAS is open.
Here, we provide an array of results, from polynomial time, to FPTAS and quasi-PTAS, for
a variety of GGs under reasonable conditions on the parameters and network characteristics
of the GG.
2.3 “Why revisit an old research note now?”
There are several motivations for reviving the old note (Ortiz, 2002).
• The note has gained significance and relevance with time. The sparse discretization
and main representation results are proving to be particularly useful in establishing
polynomial running times for a specific class of dynamic-programming and propaga-
tion algorithms.
• Many algorithmic results immediately follow from the connection to the previous
work on constraint networks in AI. Thus, this paper highlights the usefulness and
significance of those results, coming from the AI community, regarding the use of
constraint networks to solve network-structured CSPs.
• The derivation of the proof of the result on sparse discretization is deliberately sim-
ple, relative to considerably more mathematically complex proofs of the same results
(see, e.g., the derivations by Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2008): no fancy mathe-
matical sophistication needed when simple algebraic manipulations suffice. Similarly,
this short paper highlights the important, but often ignored, role that the work on
constraint networks in AI has in simplifying the derivation and analysis of algorithms
to compute approximate Nash equilibria in GGs and some of their specializations,
including normal-form games.
• This paper helps clarify the distinct pros and cons of the two approaches most often
used to compute approximate Nash Equilibria: sparse support vs. sparse discretiza-
tion.
• This paper seeks to present the state-of-the-art on computing approximate Nash equi-
libria in GGs, and lists several important open problems, particular for GG general-
izations, with important practical consequences, and for which the AI community is
particularly well-suited to eventually solve.
The following discussion expands on the first two bullet points, with some emphasis on
prior and current work in my research group or with collaborators, but mentioning briefly
potential implications for the work of other AI researchers.
2.3.1 Games as CSPs
The computation of Nash equilibria in games is inherently a CSP, an area of great rele-
vance to AI research. In the game-induced CSP, we have one variable for each player’s
mixed strategy, one domain for each player corresponding to the simplex over the player’s
5
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actions, and a set of constraints for each player’s Nash equilibrium conditions. For exam-
ple, for binary-action games, recall that a mixed-strategy is just a probability, real-valued
number between 0 and 1; thus, the number of mixed-strategies available to each player is
uncountable. Hence, the corresponding CSP would have real-valued variables, each with
an uncountably infinite domain size: an infinite or continuous CSP. The same holds for
multi-action games.
As stated previously, Kearns et al. (2001) introduced the idea in AI of using a uniform
discretization of the mixed strategies of each player which leads to a regular grid. This
turns the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria into a discrete CSP (Vickrey
& Koller, 2002), i.e., a CSP with finite, discrete domains. This paper considers the same
type of discretization.
One motivation to revisit the old note (Ortiz, 2002) is the implications it has on ex-
tensions of NashProp (Ortiz & Kearns, 2003) based on survey propagation (SP) (Mezard,
2003; Parisi, 2003d; Parisi, 2003a; Braunstein & Zecchina, 2004; Braunstein, Me´zard, &
Zecchina, 2005; Maneva, Mossel, & Wainwright, 2007), a message-passing technique with
roots in physics and introduced to computer science to solve boolean satisfiability prob-
lems, such as random 3-SAT formulas (Me´zard, Parisi, & Zecchina, 2002; Parisi, 2003c;
Me´zard, 2004), and more generally, a variety of CSPs, such as graph 3-coloring (Parisi,
2003b). Ortiz (2008) introduced an axiomatic way to view the standard SP algorithm for
boolean satisfiability, and an approach called constraint propagation relaxation (CPR) that
facilitates the derivation of SP-like techniques tailored to specific CSPs. In the case of GGs,
the computation of each message-passing, between players, takes exponential time in the
size of the discretization of the space of mixed strategies. (A thorough description of the
SP-like version of NashProp is beyond the scope of this paper.) But the improved bound
on the discretization size for each player is logarithmic in the representation size of the GG,
assuming a constant number of actions, leading to a running time that is polynomial in
1/ǫ, where ǫ is the approximation-quality parameter, and either quasi-polynomial in the
representation size of the game in the case of arbitrary maximum neighborhood size k, or
simply polynomial in the case k is bounded by a constant, independent of the number of
players n. The representation size of each message is simply quadratic in k, m and 1/ǫ,
even if k and m are free parameters.
Another motivation for considering GG generalizations is that they include the class
of graphical poly-matrix games, which in the case of 2-action games relates to linear (or
generalized linear) influence games (Irfan & Ortiz, 2011, 2013; Irfan, 2013). In part because
of their very compact representations (i.e., of size O(nm2)), poly-matrix games (Janovskaja,
1968) are an important class of games within game theory. We revisit their graphical version
when we consider generalizations of GGs in Section 7.
In summary, particular interest in the application of CPR to derive better algorithms for
computing and counting Nash equilibria in arbitrary, loopy GGs, as well as more specific
GG classes such as linear or generalized-linear influence games (Irfan & Ortiz, 2011, 2013;
Irfan, 2013), motivates this paper in large part.
Similarly, the new bounds may also provide improvements to previous discretization-
based schemes for computing ǫ-Nash equilibria in other similar models (e.g., those of Singh
et al., 2004; Soni et al., 2007).
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3. Preliminaries
This section introduces the basic technical notation and concepts necessary to understand
the upcoming technical sections of the research note.
3.1 Basic Notation
Denote by x ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) an n-dimensional vector and by x−i ≡ (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
the same vector without component i. Similarly, for every set S ⊂ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n}, denote
by xS ≡ (xi : i ∈ S) the (sub-)vector formed from x using only components in S, such
that, if Sc ≡ [n]− S denotes the complement of S, x ≡ (xS , xSc) ≡ (xi, x−i) for every i. If
A1, . . . , An are sets, denote by A ≡ ×i∈[n]Ai, A−i ≡ ×j∈[n]−{i}Aj and AS ≡ ×j∈SAj .
If G = (V,E) is an undirected graph, then for each i ∈ V denote by Ni ≡ {j | (j, i) ∈ E}
the neighbors of node/vertex i in G, and Ni ≡ Ni
⋃
{i} the neighborhood of node/vertex i in
G. Note that we have i /∈ Ni but i ∈ Ni for all i ∈ V .
3.2 Graphical Games in Local Normal-Form Payoff Representations
This section formally defines graphical games (GGs), which are graphical models for compact
representations of classical game representations in game theory (Kearns et al., 2001). GGs
extend and generalize normal-form games. In particular, a normal-form game is a GG with
a complete/fully-connected graph.
Definition 1. A graphical game (GG) consists of an undirected graph G = (V,E), 7 where
each node i ∈ V in the graph corresponds to a player i in the game, and for each player
i, we have a set of actions or pure strategies Ai and a local payoff hypermatrix/function
M ′i : ANi → R, where Ni is the neighborhood of player i in the graph defined with respect
to the edges E of the graph. The (global) payoff hypermatrix/function Mi of player i is such
that, for each joint-action x ∈ A ≡ AV , we have Mi(x) ≡ M
′
i(xNi). That is, the payoff
that each individual player i receives when all players, including i, take joint-action/pure-
strategy x is a function of the joint-actions xNi of player i’s neighborhood Ni only, thus
conditionally independent of xV−Ni given xNi. It is convention to let V = {1, . . . , n} ≡ [n],
so that n ≡ |V |. The representation size of each local payoff hypermatrix M ′i is Θ(|ANi |) =
O(mk), where m ≡ maxi∈V |Ai| and k ≡ maxi∈V |Ni|. The representation size of the GG
is Θ(
∑
i∈V |ANi |) = O(nm
k). If for all i we have Ni = V , then the GG is a standard
normal-form game, also called strategic- or matrix-form game, which has a representation
size Θ(n|A|) = O(nmn).
A GG achieves considerable representation savings whenever k ≪ n.
3.3 Solution Concepts
A joint mixed strategy p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn) in a game is formed from each individual mixed
strategy pi ≡ (pi(xi) : xi ∈ Ai) for player i, which is a probability distribution over the
players actions Ai (i.e., pi(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ Ai and
∑
xi∈Ai
pi(xi) = 1). Denote by
Pi ≡ { pi | pi(xi) ≥ 0, for all xi ∈ Ai and
∑
xi∈Ai
pi(xi) = 1} the set of all possible mixed
7. It is easy to extend the same result to GGs with directed graphs.
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strategies of player i (i.e., all possible probability distributions over Ai). Similar to the
vector notation introduced above, for all i and any clique/set S ⊂ V , denote by p−i and pS
the mixed strategies corresponding to all the players except i and all the players in clique
S, respectively, so that p ≡ (pi, p−i) ≡ (pS, pV−S). A joint mixed strategy p induces a joint
(product) probability distribution over the joint action space A, such that, for all x ∈ A,
p(x) ≡
∏
i∈V pi(xi) is the probability, with respect to joint mixed strategy p, that joint
action x is played.
The expected payoff of player i with respect to joint mixed strategy p is denoted by
Mi(p) ≡
∑
x∈A p(x)Mi(x).
Definition 2. For any ǫ ≥ 0, a joint mixed-strategy p∗is called an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if
for every player i, and for all xi ∈ Ai, Mi(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) ≥Mi(xi, p
∗
i )− ǫ. That is, no player can
increase its expected payoff more than ǫ by unilaterally deviating from its mixed strategy
part p∗i in the equilibrium, assuming the others play according to their respective parts p
∗
−i.
A Nash equilibrium, or more formally, a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium, is then a 0-Nash
equilibrium.
Note that, for all p−i ∈ P−i, maxpi∈Pi Mi(pi, p−i) = maxxi∈Ai Mi(xi, p−i) ≥Mi(x
′
i, p−i),
for all x′i ∈ Ai. Also, note that the equilibrium conditions are invariant to affine transforma-
tions. In the case of GGs with local payoff matrices represented in tabular/matrix/normal-
form, it is convention to assume, without loss of generality, that the payoff values are such
that, for each player i ∈ V , we have minxMi(x) = minxNi M
′
i(xNi) = 0 and maxxMi(x) =
maxxNi M
′
i(xNi) = 1. Note that in the case of GGs using such “tabular” representations,
we do not lose generality by assuming the maximum and minimum local payoff values of
each player are 0 and 1, respectively, because we can compute them both efficiently. This
will not be the case for GG generalizations, in the worst case. Section 7 revisits this point.
4. Discretization Schemes
The discretization scheme considered here is similar to that of (Kearns et al., 2001), except
that we allow for the possibility of different discretization sizes for the mixed strategies of
players.
Definition 3. In an (individually-uniform) discretization scheme, the uncountable set I =
[0, 1] of possible value assignments to the probability pi(xi) of each action xi of each player i
is approximated by a finite grid defined by the set I˜i = {0, τi, 2τi, . . . , (si − 1)τi, 1} of values
separated by the same distance τi = 1/si for some integer si. Thus the discretization size
is |I˜i| = si + 1. Then, we would only consider mixed strategies qi such that qi(xi) ∈ I˜i for
all xi, and
∑
xi∈Ai
qi(xi) = 1. The induced discretized space of joint mixed strategies is
I˜ ≡ ×i∈V I˜
|Ai|
i , subject to the individual normalization constraints.
5. Sparse Discretization
The obvious question is, how small can we make si and still guarantee that there exists
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the induced discretized space of joint mixed strategies? The
following corollary provides a stronger answer for GGs: it provides values for the si’s that
8
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guarantee that for every Nash equilibrium, its closest point in the induced grid is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. An interesting aspect of the result is that si depends only on information local
to player i’s neighborhood: the number of actions |Ai| available to player i and the largest
number of neighbors |Nj | of the neighbors j ∈ Ni of player i.
Note that the corresponding discretization bound provided in (Kearns et al., 2001) in
the context of GGs is exponential in the largest neighborhood size k. In contrast, the bound
here is linear in k, a substantial reduction.
The corollary is a GG instantiation of the Nash-equilibria Representation Theorem based
on sparse discretization, Theorem 3, which holds for a broader class of GG generalizations.
The statement and discussion of the theorem is in Section 7. The statement of the corollary
uses notation introduced above.
Corollary 1. (Sparse Discretization for Graphical Games) For any m-action graph-
ical game and any ǫ > 0, a (individually-uniform) discretization with
si =
⌈
2 |Ai| maxj∈Ni |Nj |
ǫ
⌉
= O
(
mk
ǫ
)
for each player i is sufficient to guarantee that for every true (i.e., not approximate) Nash
equilibrium of the game, its closest (in ℓ∞ distance) joint mixed strategy in the induced
discretized space is also an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the game.
6. Algorithmic Implications
One objective of this research note is to clarify the distinction between sparse discretization
and sparse support in the context of approximate Nash equilibria. The next subsection
deals with that objective in the context of normal-form games. Then, the second subsec-
tion presents the algorithmic implications of the sparse-discretization approach, borrowing
heavily from standard results in AI, and highlighting their simplifying usefulness and pow-
ers.
Before starting the presentation, it is important to note a crucial distinction between the
parameters of interest in GGs versus those of normal-form games, a specialization of GGs.
In the study of GGs, the main objects of interest, in terms of input-game representation
size, is the number of players n and the graph structure (e.g., the maximum number of
neighbors k, the graph tree-width, or the hypertree-width of the game-induced constraint
network), and their effect in both representation and computations of (approximate) Nash
equilibria; the maximum number of actions m of each player plays a lesser role, and is
often assumed constant. Yet, the statements of the results here still sometimes include the
explicit dependence on m, so that such dependence is clear should m also be an impor-
tant component/aspect of interest in evaluating the quality of the approximations and the
resulting algorithms.
6.1 Sparse Discretization vs. Sparse/Small Support
Before starting this subsection, it is important to clarify that the work of Altho¨fer (1994)
does not imply, and cannot be used to derive, the sparse representation result presented
as the main technical contribution here. Instead, the approximation bounds presented
9
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in Lipton et al. (2003) follow immediately from those of Altho¨fer (1994); in fact, both
use the same approach based on applying Hoe¨ffding bounds (Hoeffding, 1963) and the
probabilistic method (Alon & Spencer, 2004). More recently, He´mon et al. (2008) derived a
slightly improved small-support upper-bound result in multi-player games by using a more
general large deviation bound than Hoe¨ffding’s, due to McDiarmid (1989).
It is equally important to understand the distinctions between the two types of approx-
imations. Each type has their own pros and cons.
As a warmup to the results and discussion regarding GGs and their generalization, let us
first consider GG simplifications, starting with the simple case of 2-player games in normal
form, and then moving to n-player games in normal-form.
6.1.1 Bimatrix games
In the small-support approach to approximation, we perform a brute-force support-enumeration
search over all possible
(
m
r
)
subsets of strategies, where r is the minimum support necessary
to guarantee the desired absolute approximation quality ǫ > 0; thus, it is important to
keep in mind that r depends on ǫ. Hence, the running time of approximation algorithms
of that type is
(m
r
)
= O(mr), thus polynomial in m but exponential in a function of the
approximation parameter. Given ǫ > 0, the support size that results from the approach
of Altho¨fer (1994) and Lipton et al. (2003) is r = O
(
ln (mn)
ǫ2
)
. It is a well-known fact that
given the supports for each player in a Nash equilibrium, one can set up a simple linear
program (LP) to find the Nash equilibrium. Each call to the LP runs in polynomial time
in r. This leads to a naive brute-force algorithm, also called “support enumeration,” for
computing ǫ-Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games: for each possible support set of size r, run
an LP to either find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium or decide there is none with that particular set.
There are
(m
r
)
= O(mr) possible support for each player. Hence, for 2-player games, the
algorithm runs in time mO(r) = m
O
(
lnm
ǫ2
)
, thus exponential in 1/ǫ2, and also exponential in
(lnm)2, which means quasi-polynomial in m.
But, there is actually an alternative to the LP. Because of the probabilistic way in which
the result for sparse supports arises (i.e., using a combination of Hoeffding’s or other large
deviation bound and invoking the probabilistic method), we only need to search over mixed
strategies in the support whose individual probability value has the form zk/r, for each
action k = 1, . . . ,m, and
∑
k zk/r = 1, 0 ≤ zk ≤ r. Lipton et al. (2003) call such “dis-
cretization scheme” r-uniform. Another way of viewing this is as a uniform-discretization
scheme of size r + 1, which does not seem to guarantee to find all Nash equilibria, but it
does guarantee to find at least one. Thus, in that case, the worst-case running time to
find at least one ǫ-Nash equilibrium is (mr)O(r). Recalling that r = O
(
lnm
ǫ2
)
, we have that
the worst-case running time is still exponential in 1/ǫ2 and exponential in (lnm)2, thus
quasi-polynomial in m.
Regardless, because the representation size of the game is N = O(m2), both algorithms
run in time NO(lnN), thus both are quasi-PTASs for computing approximate Nash equilibria
in bimatrix games (Lipton et al., 2003).
In contrast, suppose that s is the size of the uniform-grid sparse discretization presented
here. A simple analysis reveals s = O
(
m
ǫ
)
. Hence, using the sparse discretization, a naive
brute-force search runs in time O
((
m
ǫ
)m)
, thus polynomial in 1/ǫ, but exponential inm lnm.
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6.1.2 Multiplayer games
For multiplayer games, one cannot use an LP to compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium even if one
were to know the support of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium strategies of all players. This is because
now the ǫ-Nash equilibrium conditions are highly non-linear, involving the product of n
variables, where n is the number of players, each variable corresponding to the probability
of a particular action in the mixed strategy of a player. (Recall that a Nash equilibrium
is a product distribution.) Thus, it might first appear unclear how to efficiently perform
this computation efficiently in multiplayer games. It would seem, on the surface, that for
sparse support, an algorithm based on support enumeration would run in worst-case time
O (mr nrtime(n,m, r)), where rtime(n,m, r) is the worst-case running time of the algorithm
that attempts to compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with the given players’ supports, and is a
direct function of r,m, and n, and of course, indirectly, of ǫ too.
But, as mentioned in the case of bimatrix games, because of the probabilistic way in
which the result for sparse supports arises, we only need to search over the set of r-uniform
mixed strategies in the support. Thus, using this approach of support enumeration the
worst-case running time becomes rtime(n,m, r) = O
((m
r
)
rr
)
. Thus, the total running
time is O ((mr)r n). Lipton et al. (2003) proved that using r = O
(
n2 ln (n2m)
ǫ2
)
is suffi-
cient. 8 Substituting that value of r, the expression of the worst-case running time becomes
m
O
(
(n3 ln (n2m))
(
1
ǫ2
ln 1
ǫ2
))
. Now, to obtain a quasi-PTAS, we would have to impose a condi-
tion on n, such as n = O(lnm). This is unlike the bimatrix-game case in which no restriction
was necessary.
In contrast, for sparse discretization in multiplayer games, the value of s = O
(
m n
ǫ
)
.
Hence, a brute-force search algorithm applied to a normal-form game, for example, would
run in worst-case time
(
mn
ǫ
)O(mn)
, thus polynomial in 1/ǫ, but exponential in mn lnmn.
(The results for GGs are in a later section.) To obtain a quasi-PTAS, we would have to
impose a condition on m = poly(n), not n.
6.1.3 Tradeoff
The tradeoff is now clear. If the interest is m, and ǫ is fixed, then the approach of Altho¨fer
(1994) and Lipton et al. (2003) is better. On the other hand, if the interest is ǫ, and m
is fixed, which is often the case for GGs as discussed above, then the sparse discretization
wins. It is important to note that the sparse discretization guarantees the computation
of all ǫ-Nash equilibria, while the sparse-support approach can only guarantee one ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. It is also important to note that in the case of multiplayer games, the sparse-
support approach yields a quasi-PTAS only after bounding n, which is the quantity of most
interest in GGs. The sparse-discretization approach bounds m, which is the number of
actions of each player to obtain a quasi-PTAS, but m is not as significant in a GG setting
as n is.
8. The reader should be aware that the notation of Lipton et al. (2003) is the exact opposite of the one
here: here n denotes the number of players, while there it denotes the maximum number of actions of
any player; also, here m denotes the maximum number of actions of any player, while there it denotes
the number of players.
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6.2 Reductions to Consistency in CSPs
This section involves concepts from AI and graph theory; in the interest of space, the reader
is referred to appropriate standard references (see, e.g., the textbooks of Russell & Norvig,
2003, for AI and Dechter, 2003 for graph theory as used in AI; or Bollobas, 1979 for graph
theory).
The representation result of the last section has several immediate computational conse-
quences for the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in GGs with local payoff
matrices represented in tabular form, and in turn, also for multi-player games represented
in standard normal (tabular) form.
To simplify the presentation, let us assume that payoff values are in [0, 1], all the players
in the GG have the same number of actions m and the largest neighborhood size in the
graph of the game is k, so that the representation size of the GG is Θ(nmk). For this case,
the uniform discretization presented in Theorem 3 has size s = si = O(mk/ǫ) for all i.
6.2.1 Sparse-discretization GG-induced CSP
Once we introduce a discretization over the space of mixed strategies, then it is natural to
formulate the problem of computing ǫ-Nash equilibria on the induced discretized space as a
CSP, or more specifically in the case of GGs, as a special type of constraint network (Dechter,
2003). (In the interest of keeping this paper short, please see Russell & Norvig, 2003, or
other introductory textbook on AI, for general information on CSPs. The presentation
here contains only the CSP concepts necessary exclusively within the context of the paper’s
topic.) Several researchers have taken this or related approaches either explicitly or implic-
itly (Kearns et al., 2001; Vickrey & Koller, 2002; Ortiz & Kearns, 2003; Soni et al., 2007).
The CSP for the game has one variable, domain and constraint for each player. Each vari-
able corresponds to mixed strategy pi for each player i. Each variable’s domain corresponds
to the discretized set I˜mi of mixed strategies for each player i, properly corrected to account
for normalization. The approximate best-response equilibrium conditions are the following:
for each player i, each constraint function (table) ci : I˜
mk
i → {0, 1} is defined such that, for
all pN(i) ∈ I˜
mk
i , ci(pN(i)) = 1 if and only if Mi(pi, p−i) ≥ maxx′i∈Ai Mi(x
′
i, p−i) − ǫ. Each
constraint has arity at most k and encodes the approximate best-response equilibrium condi-
tions, each represented in tabular form using smk = O((mk/ǫ)mk) bits. The transformation
takes time O(poly(n, (mk/ǫ)mk)) and the size of the resulting CSP is T = Θ(n(mk/ǫ)mk).
As previously discussed, for GGs, it is natural to consider the number of players n
as being the “free” parameter of the representation. Hence, if mk log(mk) = O(log(n))
and ǫ = nΩ(−1/(mk)) = (mk)−Ω(1) = (log n)−Ω(1), then both the time to perform the CSP
transformation and its resulting representation size are polynomial in the representation size
of the game (i.e., polynomial in the number of players). Similarly, if m and k are bounded
(by a constant, independent of n), then the representation size of the game is linear in n
and the running time of the transformation is polynomial in n and 1/ǫ. Note that this
is a natural restriction on the game parameters because otherwise the representation size
would be exponential in the number of players, thus defeating the main purpose of the GG
representation in the first place: succinctness.
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At this point, we can apply any of a large number of existing off-the-shelf techniques for
solving the induced game-CSP, or apply techniques such as NashProp (Ortiz & Kearns,
2003) that take advantage of the particular properties of the game best-response constraints.
Instead, in the next section, we will see how standard results for solving constraint
networks (Dechter, 2003) lead immediately to simple derivations of algorithmic results for
GGs, some of which had been independently re-discovered by employing more sophisticated
mathematical tools (Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2008). Facilitated in large part by the
knowledge acquired for solving constraint networks and other graphical models in the AI
community over the last 50 years, the derivations here are quite straightforward and do not
require complex mathematics. By building on existing AI knowledge, fancy mathematical
derivations for the same result become unnecessary despite their elegance.
6.2.2 An approach based on the GG-induced CSP hypergraph
An approach to solving CSPs in AI, now over 10 years olds, works on the hypergraph
induced by the game CSP (Gottlob, Leone, & Scarcello, 2001). If T is the representation
size of the game-CSP, w is the hypertree width of the hypergraph, and the corresponding
hypertree decomposition for the CSP has been computed, then solving the CSP takes time
O(Tw+1 log(T )) (Gottlob, Leone, & Scarcello, 2000, 2002; Gottlob et al., 2001) (see also
page 158 of “Bibliographical and Historical Notes” Section in Chapter 5 of Russell & Norvig,
2003). In the case of GGs, we can compute the hypertree decomposition that the algorithm
would use in time O(n2w+2).
The following theorem summarizes the discussion. As a preamble to a discussion on
primal graphs and treewidths later in the section, note that it is known that a CSP might
have hypergraphs with bounded hypertree width, but whose primal graph has unbounded
treewidth. However, the treewidth always bounds the hypertree width. Thus, the restriction
that the hypertree width be bounded by a constant may not be as limiting to the application
of the results as it first appears.
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a number ǫ > 0 and a GG
with n players, maximum neighborhood size k and maximum number of actions m, and
whose corresponding CSP has a hypergraph with hypertree width w, computes an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of the GG in time [n (mk/ǫ)mk]O(w).
The following corollary characterizes the computational complexity of the approximation
schemes resulting from instances of the last theorem.
Corollary 2. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a GG with corresponding
hypergraph of hypertree width w bounded by a constant independent of the number of players
n, with a logarithmic function of n restricting the maximum number of actions m and the
maximum neighborhood size k as mk log(mk) = O(log(n)), and given ǫ = nΩ(−1/(mk)) =
(mk)−Ω(1) = (log n)−Ω(1), outputs an ǫ-Nash equilibria of the game in time polynomial
in the representation size of the input. If, in particular, both m and k are bounded by
constants independent of n, then the algorithm runs in polynomial time in n and 1/ǫ, for
any ǫ > 0; hence, the algorithm is a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
If, instead, the expression constraining m and k as a logarithmic function of n holds, and
w = polylog(n), then the algorithm is a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (quasi-
PTAS).
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6.2.3 A side note on normal-form games
For normal-form games, k = n and w = 1. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3. There exists a quasi-PTAS for computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of n-player
m-action normal-form games with m = O(poly(n)) that runs in time NO(polylog (N) log(1/ǫ)) =(
1
ǫ
)O(polylog(N))
, where N = nΘ(n) is the representation size of the game. If, in particular,
m is bounded by a constant independent of n, then the running time is NO(log
log(N)
ǫ
), where
N = 2Θ(n) is the corresponding representation size of the game.
As briefly mentioned in Section 6.1.2, we can also obtain the same result by using the
sparse-support approach of Lipton et al. (2003), even if m = 2O(n), but the dependence is
exponential in 1/ǫ2 (i.e., NO(polylog(N)(1/ǫ)
2); or NO(
log(N)
ǫ2
), if m is bounded by a constant).
The result of the last corollary for the case of m fixed or bounded by a constant is stated
by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2008). The same result for m fixed or bounded by a
constant also follows from Theorem 4 of Kearns (2007). While no formal proof appears for
Theorem 4 of Kearns (2007), the theorem follows immediately from the proof in the original
note of Ortiz (2002).
But, it is important to emphasize, as touched upon in Section 6.1.2, that in the case
of normal-form games, we could have obtained the result directly by using an exhaustive
search over the induced grid over mixed strategies, which is essentially what the algorithm
referred to in the corollary reduces to in this case. Hence, we could output not just one
ǫ-Nash equilibrium, but all ǫ-Nash equilibria in the induced grid in the worst-case running
time given in the corollary. The algorithms based on the sparse-support approach can
only guarantee to output one ǫ-Nash equilibrium among all mixed strategies of a given
maximum support. Algorithms based on sparse support that would output (a compact
representation of) all ǫ-Nash equilibria do not seem to exist, even for the given maximum
support size; let alone (a compact representation of) all ǫ-Nash equilibria in the game,
as the exhaustive search that uses the sparse discretization result presented here does for
normal-form games. Section 6.1 here discusses the distinctions between the sparse-support
and the sparse-discretization approaches.
6.2.4 An approach based on the GG-induced CSP primal graph
Another approach is to build a clique (or join) tree from the primal graph of the game-CSP,
which in the case of the GGs is the graph created by forming cliques of every neighborhood.
Then, one applies a dynamic programming (or message-passing) algorithm on the clique
tree. Once the clique tree is built, the running time is linear in the number of nodes of the
join tree and exponential in the size of the largest clique associated to a node in the clique
tree. If the primal graph has treewidth w′, the largest clique associated to the optimal
clique tree is w′+1. It has been common knowledge in the graphical-models community for
quite a while now, almost two decades, at least (see, e.g., the textbooks of Dechter, 2003;
Russell & Norvig, 2003, and the references therein, for a recent accounting of previous
work in this area) that if the primal graph of a CSP has treewidth w′ that is logarithmic
in the number of nodes n, then one can solve the CSP in polynomial time if the CSP
is represented in tabular form. The following theorem and corollary follow from careful
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application of previously known results for solving constraint networks and other related
graphical models. Note that the treewidth w′′ of the original graph of the game is always
no smaller than the hypertree width w of its hypergraph (Gottlob et al., 2005). In addition,
the GG’s primal graph treewidth w′ ≤ (w” + 1)k (Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2006). So
the interesting bounds in the hypertree case is as given in the corollary. Also, this means
that the results can be easily extended to GGs with (original) graphs that have O(log(n))
treewidth as long as k is bounded. Finally, if a graph with n nodes has treewidth w′,
then the graph has at most (w′ + 1)n edges (see, e.g., the work of Becker & Geiger, 2001).
Because the number of edges of a GG primal graph is O(k2n), w′ = O(log(n)) implies
k = O(
√
log(n)).
Theorem 2. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a number ǫ > 0 and an n-player
m-action GG with maximum neighborhood size k and primal-graph treewidth w′, computes
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the game in time 2O(w
′)n log(n) + n[(mk/ǫ)mk]O(w
′).
Corollary 4. There exists a PTAS for computing an approximate Nash equilibria in n-
player GGs with bounded maximum number of actions, bounded neighborhood size and
primal-graph treewidth w′ = O(log(n)).
The new discretization bounds also provide significant improvements on the representa-
tion results and running times for NashProp and its variants (Kearns et al., 2001; Ortiz
& Kearns, 2003).
7. Graphical Multi-hypermatrix Games: Generalizing Graphical Games
This section introduces graphical multi-hypermatrix games (GMhGs), a class of games that
extends and generalizes GGs while capturing many classical game-theoretic model repre-
sentations, as discussed below. This class of games is not some theoretical concoction: they
are not only convenient in their generality, covering a large number of existing models, but
also practical. Indeed, Yu and Berthod (1995) used the same type of games to establish an
equivalence between local maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) inference in Markov random fields
and the Nash equilibria of the induced game. 9
This section also states and discuss the core theorem on sparse discretization in this
broader class generalizing GGs. The simplicity, broadness and strength of impact makes
this extension theorem the major technical contribution of this research note.
Definition 4. A graphical multi-hypermatrix game (GMhG) is defined by a set V of n
players, and for each player i ∈ V , a set of actions, or pure strategies, Ai; a set Ci ⊂ 2
V
of cliques, or hyperedges, such that if C ∈ Ci then i ∈ C; and a set {M
′
i,C : AC → R |
9. Unbeknown at the time, the MRF-induced game is a potential game (Monderer & Shapley, 1996);
therefore sequential (or synchronous) best-response dynamics converges. Because, in addition, the goal
in MAP inference is to obtain a global optimum configuration, in an attempt to avoid local minima, Yu
and Berthod (1995) proposed a Metropolis-Hastings-style algorithm, which is also similar to simulated
annealing algorithms used for solving satisfiability problems, and other local methods such as WalkSAT.
We can view their proposed method as a kind of learning-in-games scheme (Fudenberg & Levine, 1999)
based on best-response with random exploration, or “trembling hand” best-response, in which, at every
round, each player individually play some best-response, with some probability; otherwise the player
replays the player’s previous/last response.
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C ∈ Ci} of local-clique payoff matrices. For each player i ∈ V , the sets N(i) ≡ ∪C∈CiC
and Ni ≡ {j ∈ V | i ∈ N(j), j 6= i} are the clique of players affecting i’s payoff including i
(i.e., i’s neighborhood) and those affected by i not including i, respectively. The local and
global payoff matrices M ′i : AN(i) → R and Mi : A → R of i are (implicitly) defined as
M ′i(xN(i)) ≡
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(xC) and Mi(x) ≡M
′
i(xN(i)), respectively.
Connections to other game classes. If for each player, each clique set is a singleton,
we obtain a graphical game, and the single clique in the set defines the neighborhood of the
player (i.e., in that case, Ci = {N(i)} for all i). Furthermore, if, in addition, each clique is the
complete set of players, then the game is a standard normal-form game, also called strategic-
or matrix-form game (i.e., in that case, N(i) = V for all i). A GMhG becomes a classical,
standard polymatrix game (Janovskaja, 1968) if for each player i, Ci = {{i, j} | j ∈ V, j 6= i},
which is the set of cliques of pairs of nodes involving the player and every other player. 10
In contrast to hypergraphical games (Papadimitriou, 2005), a GMhG is more expressive, in
part because a GMhG does not require that the same “sub-game” (i.e., local-clique payoff
hypermatrix) be shared among all players in the clique of the “sub-game.” For example,
a local-clique payoff hypermatrix may appear in the summation defining the local payoff
hypermatrix of exactly one player. 11 A GMhG has the polynomial intersection property
and thus a polynomial correlated equilibrium scheme (Papadimitriou, 2005).
Representation size. The representation size of a GMhG is Θ(
∑
i∈V
∑
C∈Ci
∏
j∈C |Aj |) =
O(n lmc), where l ≡ maxi∈V |Ci| and c ≡ maxi∈V maxC∈Ci |C|. Hence, the size is dominated
by the representation of the local-clique payoff matrices, which are each of size exponen-
tial in their respective clique size. However, this representation size could be considerably
smaller than for a graphical game, which is exponential in the neighborhood size. For ex-
ample, if for each i, we have |Ci| ≤ k, and for each C ∈ Ci, we have |C| = 2, then the
GMhG becomes a graphical poly-matrix game, with representation size O(n km2), linear in
the maximum number of neighbors k, compared to O(nmk) for a standard graphical game
with “tabular” representations, which is exponential in k.
Payoff Scale. Normalizing the payoff of a GG in standard local strategic/normal-form
takes linear time in the representation size of the game, because we can find the minimum
and maximum local payoff values for each local payoff hypermatrix (which, for each player,
is exponential in the size of the player’s neighborhood) simply by going over each payoff
value in the hypermatrix in sequence. However, such an approach is intractable in GMhGs
in general. Denote the maximum and minimum payoff values for each player i ∈ V, ui ≡
maxxNi
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(xC) and li ≡ minxNi
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(xC), respectively. Computing both ui
and li is NP-hard. To see this, first note that ui and li are the result of a max and min
operation over an additive function of the set of the player’s hyper-edges and its possible
joint-actions. It is easy to reduce the problem of finding a solution to an arbitrary contraint
network to that of computing both ui and li for each player i. Hence, in general, we do
not have much of a choice but to assume that the payoffs of all players are in the same
scale, so that using a global approximation-quality value ǫ is meaningful; and to compute
10. Note that this is the standard definition of polymatrix games. It requires symmetry in the hyperedges:
for all pair of players i, j ∈ V, i 6= j, {i, j} ∈ Ci ∩ Cj .
11. Appendix B expands on the relation between GMhGs and hypergraphical games.
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the individual maximum and minimum values of each hypermatrix payoff of each player as
a way to set up the sparse uniform-discretization.
Some additional notation is necessary before stating the theorem. Denote by ui,C ≡
maxxC∈AC M
′
i,C(xC) and li,C ≡ minxC∈AC M
′
i,C(xC) the largest and smallest payoff values
achieved by the local-grid payoff hypermatrix M ′i,C , respectively; and by Ri,C ≡ ui,C − li,C
its largest range of values.
Theorem 3. (Sparse Nash-Equilibria Representation) For any graphical multi-hypermatrix
game and any ǫ such that
0 < ǫ ≤ 2 min
i∈V
∑
C∈Ci
Ri,C (|C| − 1)
maxC′∈Ci |C
′| − 1
,
a (uniform) discretization with
si =
⌈
2 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj
Rj,C (|C| − 1)
ǫ
⌉
for each player i is sufficient to guarantee that for every Nash equilibrium of the game,
its closest (in ℓ∞ distance) joint mixed strategy in the induced discretized space is also an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the game.
The proof of the theorem appears in Appendix C, deliberately. This is not only because
it is simple, based on algebraic manipulations only, but also because the proof is irrelevant
to the evaluation of the significance of the actual result stated in the theorem. Stating the
proof here would simply be distracting, getting in the way of the really important objective:
determining the importance of the theorem on its own.
The theorem establishes minimal sizes for each player’s individually uniform-discretization
to capture a compact representation of all Nash equilibria with respect to the resulting grid
over joint mixed strategies in GMhGs. Hence, as a result of the theorem, we can represent
every exact Nash equilibria of any GMhG via a sparse multi-dimensional grid over the joint
mixed-strategies induced by a sparse uniform-discretization of the individual probabilities of
each action of each mixed strategy of each player individually. This sparse discretization
can lead not only to compact representations of the set of exact NE, but also to tractable
algorithms or effective methods for the computation of approximate Nash equilibria in some
classes of games. We have already seen examples of important representational and com-
putational implications that result from the theorem’s application in the previous section,
which focused on GGs and some of their specializations, such as normal-form games.
Also, the generalized bound has already proved useful to derive and analyze dynamic-
programing algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria in non-trivial special
cases of interdependent defense (IDD) games with specific, practical graph structures. Chan,
Ceyko, and Ortiz (2012) recently introduced IDD games to model, study, and analyze se-
curity and defense mechanism for deterrence in network-structured interdependent security
systems under the risk of a deliberate attack from an external agent. One objective is
the potential to study the effect of minimal interventions in overall system security for
deterrence purposes.
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Another example in which the generalized bounds have proven useful is in the design
of specific instantiations of CPR that lead to versions of survey propagation for arbitrary
GGs, which generalize NashProp (Ortiz & Kearns, 2003), and for linear influence games
(Irfan & Ortiz, 2011, 2013; Irfan, 2013). In the particular case of Survey NashProp, the
theorem helped us jump a major hurdle. Each message-passing process in most general CPR
instances require time exponential in the size of the largest variable domains in the CSP;
this is in contrast to NashProp whose running time is linear in the domain size. In the
case of Survey NashProp, that would be exponential in the number of mixed-strategies
it considers due to the discretization of the mixed-strategy space; for NashProp, on the
other hand, that would be quasi-linear. But using the generalized version of the sparse
discretization result given in the last theorem, we can now perform each message-passing
in time exponential in k2, which means quasi-linear in the size of the input with respect to
k, while keeping the size of the messages quadratic in the representation size of the game,
assuming m is bounded by a constant, independent of n. In short, this means that we can
now perform each message-passing step in time quasi-linear in the size of the game!
Unlike for standard GGs, the broader algorithmic and computational implications of
the sparse discretization in GMhGs remains wide open for the most part. The next section
lists and briefly discusses several of such open problems.
8. Concluding Remarks and Open Problems to the AI Community
While sparse-discretization result for graphical games (GGs) and its algorithmic implications
are actually old, going back to a simple unpublished note wrote in 2002 (Ortiz, 2002),
posted online a few months later as part of a course on computational game theory at the
University of Pennsylvania, 12 it has gained considerable relevance over the last few years
because of the need to deal with even more compact representations than GGs provide, and
algorithms/heuristics that require running times exponential in the size of the discretization,
thus linear in the size of the model, under many reasonable conditions. Of particular
relevance along this line is prior and current exploration of extensions, based on constraint
propagation relaxation (Ortiz, 2008), of survey propagation to the problem of computing
approximate Nash equilibria in GGs and recent work on linear influence games, and their
generalizations (Irfan & Ortiz, 2011, 2013; Irfan, 2013). As stated at the end of Section 2,
the new bounds may also provide improvements to previous discretization-based schemes
for computing ǫ-Nash equilibria in other similar models, such as those in the work of Singh
et al. (2004) and Soni et al. (2007).
Several open questions remain, perhaps most important of which are those related to
computation in GG generalizations such as GMhGs. The following is a partial list of open
problems for which the AI community, and in particular, the community on constraint
networks (Dechter, 2003) for CSPs, are very well equipped to solve.
• Can we combine the sparse-support and sparse-discretization approach to obtain a
better algorithm? For example, can we reduce dependency on the number of actions or
the accuracy parameter, without unduly increasing the dependency on either? A naive
12. http://www.cis.upenn.edu/\homedirmkearns/teaching/cgt/
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approach does not seem to work, but maybe a more sophisticated approach would.
Are the sparse-discretization and sparse-support approaches simply incompatible?
• Can we do away with the uniform discretization scheme and still guarantee that every
Nash equilibria is near a grid point? Would it help if the objective is to find a single
approximate solution only? What if we want our approximate Nash equilibria to also
be “stable” (i.e., near an actual Nash equilibrium)?
• Computing exact Nash equilibria, or more formally, approximate Nash equilibria with
exponentially small approximation parameter, in n-player 2-action poly-matrix games,
which is a GG generalization, is PPAD-complete. This result is an implicit corollary
of the work of Daskalakis et al. (2009b), although they do not provide any explicit,
formal proof. Yet, the design of efficient algorithms or effective heuristics for com-
puting approximate Nash equilibria in such GG generalizations is wide open! A naive
application of the sparse-discretization approach does not seem to help. Can sparse
discretization or a sparse-support approach help? If so, how?
• There is no substantive work on using the sparse-support approach for GGs, at
least not directly. Action-graph games (Jiang, Leyton-Brown, & Bhat, 2011) con-
tain GGs. Thompson, Leung, and Leyton-Brown (2011) designed methods based on
the sparse-support approach to compute approximate Nash equilibria in the context
of action-graph games. How exactly do these methods apply to GGs directly, or in-
directly, if at all? Can we adapt those methods to obtain direct versions, still based
on sparse support, for computing approximate Nash equilibria in GGs? Is the sparse-
support approach simply incompatible with GGs, when it comes to the design of
efficient or effective algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria that are
also natural within the GG context?
• One can view a sparse discretization as generating an equivalent game in which the
discretized mixed-strategy space of the original game becomes the pure strategies of
the equivalent game. It seems possible to extend the computational results of Gottlob
et al. (2005) by considering the computation of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the
equivalent game, which corresponds to approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of
the original game. How to do this exactly requires further research and thus remains
open.
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Appendix A. What is Beyond the Scope of This Short Paper?
This section briefly discusses some motivation for the study of Nash equilibria and other
technical aspects that, while interesting, addressing them within this short paper will make
it lose its focus.
19
Ortiz
A.1 Significance of Non-cooperative Game Theory and Nash Equilibria
At this point, it would not be an exaggeration to say that game theory and the concept of
Nah equilibrium have touched almost all areas of science and engineering. The list of the
multitude of areas and applications would be too long to present here. It is beyond the
scope of this note to discuss the theoretical and practical relevance that non-cooperative
game theory and the concept of a Nash equilibrium have to real-world problem. But, here
are a few quotes from the organization that awards what most people call the “Nobel Prize
in Economics” every year. They give a taste for the broader impact of non-cooperative
game theory and the Nash equilibria as a solution concept.
Summary: “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel 1994 was awarded jointly to John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr.
and Reinhard Selten ”for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of
non-cooperative games”.” 13
Press Release: “Game theory is a mathematical method for analyzing strategic
interaction.” 14
Press Release: “Many interesting economic issues, such as the analysis of oligopoly,
originate in non-cooperative games. In general, firms cannot enter into bind-
ing contracts regarding restrictive trade practices because such agreements are
contrary to trade legislation. Correspondingly, the interaction among a govern-
ment, special interest groups and the general public concerning, for instance,
the design of tax policy is regarded as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilib-
rium has become a standard tool in almost all areas of economic theory. The
most obvious is perhaps the study of competition between firms in the theory of
industrial organization. But the concept has also been used in macroeconomic
theory for economic policy, environmental and resource economics, foreign trade
theory, the economics of information, etc. in order to improve our understanding
of complex strategic interactions.” 15
A.2 Other Game-theoretic Graphical Models
This note does not consider other kinds of graphical models for game theory such as mul-
tiagent influence diagrams (MAIDs) (Koller & Milch, 2003), which provide graphical mod-
els for extensive-form games, action-graph games (Jiang et al., 2011), 16 which exploit
“context-sensitive” conditional expected-payoff independence, and expected utility networks
(EUNs) (La Mura, 2000), which focuses on models for the “strategic” decision-making
aspects of a single, individual player.
13. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1994/
14. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1994/press.html
15. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1994/press.html
16. Thompson et al. (2011) considers enumeration methods based on sparse support to compute approximate
Nash equilibria in the context of action-graph games.
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A.3 Relative and Constant Approximations
This note only considers absolute approximations, the most commonly studied form of ap-
proximation of Nash equilibria. Relative approximations have also been the subject of
study, but mostly for non-graphical models (He´mon et al., 2008).
A very recent interest is to provide polynomial-time algorithms for computing Nash
equilibria of specific, constant approximation quality (see, e.g., work by Tsaknakis & Spi-
rakis, 2007; Daskalakis et al., 2009; He´mon et al., 2008; Bosse et al., 2010 and the references
therein). Most results of this kind are in 2-player games. Several authors have shown how
to turn such polynomial algorithms for a constant approximation quality from 2-player to
results for n-player, with a larger, still constant approximation quality. Most of that work
uses a sparse-support approach. This type of approximate Nash equilibria problem does
not seem to have been studied for arbitrary GGs, just specializations such as normal-form
games. This paper does not consider such problems to compute approximate Nash equi-
libria with constant approximation quality here, except for revisiting it in the list of open
problems at the end.
Appendix B. Expanding on the Relation between GMhGs and
Hypergraphical Games
In the standard definition of hypergraphical games we have a hypergraph (V, E), where each
vertex i ∈ V corresponds to a player i in the game and E ⊂ 2V is a set of hyperedges (i.e.,
sets of subsets of V ). Each player i ∈ V has a finite set of actions Ai. There is “game”
for each hyperedge C ∈ E . By “game” here we mean that each player i ∈ C has the
same set of actions Ai in all (local) “games” defined by E , and a local payoff hypermatrix
M ′′i,C(xC) that is a function of the joint-actions xC ∈ AC of all the players in C. Let
C′′i ≡ {C ∈ E | i ∈ C} be the (local) set of hyperedges that the hypergraphical game
induces for each player i ∈ V . The final/global payoff functions of each player i in the
hypergraphical game is Mi(x) ≡
∑
C∈C′′i
M ′′i,C(xC).
Note that by definition, for all pairs of players i, j ∈ V , we have that, for any hyperedge
C ∈ E such that i, j ∈ C, the following symmetry property must hold in a hypergraphical
game: C ∈ C′′i if and only if C ∈ C
′′
j . GMhGs do not require this symmetry condition.
Of course, from a mathematical perspective, one can always take a GMhG with a set of
player’s hyperedges Ci and local hypermatrices M
′
i,C for each player i ∈ V and hyperedge
C ∈ Ci, and turn it into a hypermatrix game; just as one can take a GG and turn it
into a normal-form game. In the case of the GMhG transformation, we can set the set
of hyperedges E of the GMhG-induced hypergraphical game to E ≡ ∪i∈V ∪C∈Ci C, and,
letting the GMhG-induced hyperedges C′i ≡ {C ∈ E | i ∈ C} for all i ∈ V . Then, for every
i ∈ V , we must either create a local zero-valued hypermatrixM ′′i,C(xC) ≡ 0, for all xC ∈ AC
if C 6∈ Ci; otherwise, if C ∈ Ci, set the local hypermatrix of the hypergraphical game to
M ′′i,C ≡M
′
i,C .
Indeed, one can take any game with a finite number of players and actions and always
turn it back into a normal-form game. But, from a computational perspective, such transfor-
mations could take an exponential amount of time and space, defeating the main purpose for
introducing compact, tractable, and flexible representations of significant expressive power
in the first place! Although, from a theoretical standpoint, the given transformation from
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GMhGs to hypergraphical games is computationally efficient, from a practical standpoint,
the loss in expressive power is clear, and significant.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
To simplify notation, given any joint mixed-strategy (i.e., a product distribution) p, for all
B ⊂ V , and xB ∈ AB, we denote by p(xB) ≡
∏
i∈B pi(xi) =
∑
x−B
p(xB, x−B) the joint
mixed-strategy over players in B only (i.e., marginal product-distributions of p over the
joint-actions of players in B). Let p and q be two joint mixed strategies and, for each player
i and each action xi, denote by ∆i(xi) ≡ pi(xi) − qi(xi). In a slight abuse of notation, let
∆(xS) ≡
∏
k∈S ∆k(xk).
The following very simple lemma is a cornerstone of the proof.
Lemma 1. (Product-Distribution Differences) For any clique B ⊂ V of players, for
any clique joint action xB,
p(xB)− q(xB) =
∑
S∈2B−∅
∆(xS) q(xB−S) .
Proof. The lemma follows by applying a binomial expansion:
p(xB) =
∏
j∈B
(qj(xj) + ∆j(xj))
=
∑
S∈2B
∆(xS) q(xB−S)
=q(xB) +
∑
S∈2B−∅
∆(xS) q(xB−S) .
To further simplify the presentation of the proof it is convenient to introduce a slight
abuse of notation: for all, i ∈ C,C ∈ Ci, B, S ⊂ C,B ∩ S = ∅, xS ∈ AS , pC−B−S ∈ PC−B−S ,
let M ′i,C(xS ,∆B , pC−B−S) ≡
∑
xB∈AB
∆(xB)M
′
i,C(xS , xB , pC−B−S).
The following useful claim follows immediately from the last lemma of joint product
distribution differences (Lemma 1).
Claim 1. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, for all i ∈ V , C ∈ Ci, B ⊂ C, xB ∈ AB and
pC−B, qC−B ∈ PC−B, we have
M ′i,C(xB , pC−B)−M
′
i,C(xB , qC−B) =
∑
S∈2C−B−∅
M ′i,C(xB ,∆S , qC−B−S) .
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Proof. Applying the last lemma on the differences between product distributions (Lemma 1),
we have
M ′i,C(xB , pC−B)−M
′
i,C(xB , qC−B) =
∑
xC−B
 ∑
S∈2C−B−∅
∆(xS)q(xC−B−S)
M ′i,C(xC)
=
∑
S∈2C−B−∅
∑
xS
∆(xS)
∑
xC−B−S
q(xC−B−S)M
′
i,C(xC)
=
∑
S∈2C−B−∅
M ′i,C(xB ,∆S , qC−B−S) .
Using some algebra we can show another useful claim.
Claim 2. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, for all i ∈ V , and C ∈ Ci, we have∑
S∈2C−∅
M ′i,C(∆S , qC−S) =
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(pi,∆B, qC−B−{i}) .
Proof. First note that we can decompose the left-hand side of the equation in the claim as∑
S∈2C−∅
M ′i,C(∆S , qC−S) =
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(qi,∆B , qC−B−{i})+∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(∆i,∆B, qC−B−{i}) .
Now note that, using the definition of ∆i, we have
M ′i,C(∆i,∆B , qC−B−{i}) =M
′
i,C(pi,∆B , qC−B−{i})−M
′
i,C(qi,∆B, qC−B−{i}) .
The claim follows after making the appropriate substitution for that expressions and sim-
plifying:∑
S∈2C−∅
M ′i,C(∆S , qC−S) =
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(qi,∆B , qC−B−{i})+∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
(M ′i,C(pi,∆B, qC−B−{i})−M
′
i,C(qi,∆B , qC−B−{i}))
=
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(pi,∆B , qC−B−{i}) .
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Suppose p is a Nash equilibrium of the game, which must exist by Nash’s Theorem (Nash,
1951). Applying the last two claims above, we obtain
Mi(p) =Mi(q) +
∑
C∈Ci
∑
S∈2C−∅
M ′i,C(∆S , qC−S)
=Mi(q) +
∑
C∈Ci
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(pi,∆B , qC−B−{i})
≥max
x′i
Mi(x
′
i, p−i)
=max
x′
i
Mi(x′i, q−i) + ∑
C∈Ci
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
M ′i,C(x
′
i,∆B , qC−B−{i})
 .
Rearranging and simplifying, we obtain the following expression:
Mi(q) ≥max
x′i
Mi(x
′
i, q−i)+∑
C∈Ci
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
(
M ′i,C(x
′
i,∆B , qC−B−{i})−M
′
i,C(pi,∆B , qC−B−{i})
)
.
Let q be the closest (in ℓ∞ distance) joint mixed strategy in I˜, defined using sizes si as
given in the statement of the theorem, to exact Nash equilibrium p. Hence, we have
|∆i(xi)| ≤
ǫ
2 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj
Rj,C (|C| − 1)
.
Consider the conditional expected hypermatrix payoff difference in parenthesis within the
innermost summation inside the maximization of the equilibrium condition above. Noting
that
|M ′i,C(x
′
i, xB , qC−i,B )−M
′
i,C(pi, xB , qC−i,B )| ≤ Ri,C ,
we obtain the following lower bound on that innermost summation:
(
M ′i,C(x
′
i,∆B , qC−i,B )−M
′
i,C(pi,∆B , qC−i,B )
)
≥
∑
xB
[∏
k∈B
|∆k(xk)|
]
(−Ri,C)
=−Ri,C
∑
xB
∏
k∈B
|∆k(xk)| . (1)
24
Sparse Discretization for Graphical Games
We can upper bound the last factor in the right-hand side of the last expression as∑
xB
∏
k∈B
|∆k(xk)| =
∏
k∈B
∑
xk
|∆k(xk)|
≤
∏
k∈B
∑
xk
ǫ
2 |Ak| maxj∈Nk
∑
C′∈Cj
Rj,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
=
∏
k∈B
ǫ
2 maxj∈Nk
∑
C′∈Cj
Rj,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
≤
∏
k∈B
ǫ
2
∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
=
(
ǫ
2
∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
)|B|
.
Thus, using the resulting lower bound on the expression given in (1), we obtain
Mi(q) ≥ max
x′i
Mi(x
′
i, q−i)−
∑
C∈Ci
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
Ri,C
(
ǫ
2
∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
)|B|
.
The second term in the right-hand side of the last expression equals
∑
C∈Ci
Ri,C
∑
B∈2C−{i}−∅
(
ǫ
2
∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
)|B|
=
∑
C∈Ci
Ri,C
(1 + ǫ
2
∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
)|C|−1
− 1

≤
∑
C∈Ci
Ri,C
[
ǫ (|C| − 1)∑
C′∈Ci
Ri,C′ (|C ′| − 1)
]
= ǫ .
The last inequality follows from using the upper bound condition on ǫ given in the statement
of the theorem and applying the well-known inequality, 1 + z ≤ exp(z) ≤ 1 + z + z2 for
|z| < 1 (Cormen, Leiserson, & Rivest, 1990). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Appendix D. Approximation Schemes
This appendix presents a brief, general description of the different approximation schemes.
To begin, it is important to note that it is most common to define approximations in terms
of relative factors. Here, given the standard/traditional mathematical definition of approx-
imate Nash equilibria in a game setting, the description assumes that the approximation
quality is in absolute terms. The description assumes that the problem is that of computing
absolute approximations of Nash equilibria in games, as defined in the main body of the
text.
Definition 5. Let N be the representation size of the input game G and ǫ > 0 the (absolute)
approximation quality. An algorithm A is a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS)
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if, for every ǫ > 0, on input G, A runs in time polynomial in N . If, in addition, A runs in
time polynomial in 1ǫ , then A is a fully-polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
If, instead, A runs in time NO(polylog (N)), where polylog(N) denotes a polynomial function
of logN , then A is a quasi-polynomial-time approximation scheme (quasi-PTAS).
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